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The United States is embarking on a course of 
designing and fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS) to protect the US and her citizenry against 
ballistic missile attacks.  The BMDS will need a Command 
and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) 
organization/system to support military and national 
decision makers in times of crisis.  The C2BMC must also be 
able to react quickly once a missile event has occurred.  
This thesis will cover the doctrinal issues with merging 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and the National Missile 
Warning System into one system, how the Unified Command 
Plan affects missile defense efforts, the lessons learned 
from Desert Storm, and presents alternative chains of 
command that might allow the BMDS to engage threat missiles 
in a timely and efficient manner.  Preliminary findings 
indicate that a ‘flattened’ chain of command for missile 
defense forces seems to be a positive starting point for 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) will 
provide a layered global defense against ballistic missiles 
of all classes (short-, medium-, and long-range).  The 
command and control/battle management of the BMDS is a core 
element of the system-of-systems; this element is called 
the Command and Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications (C2BMC) system.  Much of the C2BMC 
capability will need to be automated, due to the speed of 
engagements, quantity of battle-related information, and 
complexity of the decision processing, all or which portend 
strict time budgets for executing battle plans.  In this 
thesis, we treat the topic of command structures; with the 
aim of identifying what type of command structure will be 
needed in order to effectively interact with the automated 
portion of the system, which will include the battle 
managers.  The initial findings indicate that the command 
structure for missile defense will need to be flattened. 
 
B. BMDS OPERATION 
The BMDS and its command and control module, the 
C2BMC, will operate in an unpredictable environment.  Like 
most strategic command and control systems the majority of 
the time the system will be tracking almost nothing, 
passing messages only to ensure that point-to-point 
connectivity is maintained.  However, the system must also 
be robust enough to neutralize any threat to the United 
States that ballistic missiles worldwide could present.  
The system will be required to help maintain the 
2 
proficiency of the staff that mans the watch.  To this end 
the system must be able to be both on-line for the sections 
that are on duty and off-line for the sections that are 
training and developing scenarios.  These stated run-time 
requirements for the BMDS and C2BMC dictate that the battle 
management, node connectivity, and command structure be 
readily adaptable in order to address new types of threats. 
The BMDS is a new and different type of warfare that 
does not easily fit into the traditional military molds.  
The use of some of these molds is, however, necessary to 
allow for the military organization to absorb and interact 
with the BMDS.  BMDS will be a global organization with 
each node depending on other nodes for the system to work 
correctly.  There are few instances of such a global 
battlespace control.  The Nuclear Triad is one possible 
example of global centralized C2, but that organization has 
never had the numbers of elements that the BMDS will have.  
The use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams in the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) is another possible example, 
but the SOF teams do not, generally, have interdependencies 
that extend more than the range of the longest artillery 
round or the longest stand off weapon.  Therefore, the 
operation of the BMDS is deemed to be different than that 
of other forms of modern warfare, to that end the 
application of a conceptual model is also different. 
 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The issues pertaining to the command and control 
structure of the BMDS are still largely unresolved.  In 
this thesis the analysis of command and control is based on 
the following: Joint Doctrine, Chairman of the Joint Chief 
3 
of Staff Instructions and Directives, personal interviews 
with Missile Defense Agency (MDA) engineers, and lessons 
learned from Desert Shield and Desert Storm to base the 
recommendations on.1  Chapter II describes the current 
battle space that BMDS is likely to be deployed into, 
applicable treaties that have steered development of 
previous missile defense systems, and instances of 
political instability that could have started a limited 
nuclear war.  Chapter III is a review of the Unified 
Command Plan, the National Security Strategy and current 
Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) doctrine to provide a basis 
for C2BMC doctrinal development.  How the C2BMC should 
operate using MDA’s Short/Medium/Long (S/M/L) Range 
engagement plan is discussed in Chapter IV.  Chapter V 
covers individual combatant command responsibilities with 
respect to missile defense, how planning for possible 
engagements will tie into current Joint Operation Planning 
guidance and lessons learned from Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm.  Chapter VI provides several options for chains of 
command for missile defense forces.  The thesis concludes 
with a discussion of the challenges and possibilities for 
the C2BMC in the upcoming deployment of BMDS. 
 
D. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
The scope of the thesis is limited to a conceptual 
exploration of the command structure for the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System.  The C2BMC will have to support the 
command structure and be adaptable to changes that will be 
                     1 Desert Shield/Desert Storm has been the only recent large force 
engagement where ballistic missiles were used in any numbers. Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom never had a ballistic 
missile fired at the defenders so the lessons learned must be judged to 
be at least a little suspect. 
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made to the base assumptions.  The conceptual model for 
BMDS command and control (C2) is based on variations of the 
current conventional forces chain of command that the US 
military has used over the last fifty years.2   
Assumptions for the model are based on the current 
Unified Command Plan (UCP), military doctrine, and current 
C2 systems.  Constraints on the conceptual model are based 
on the mission of BMDS as described by both military and 
political leaders, applicable treaties entered into by the 
United States, the short-, medium-, and long-range missile 
layered defensive scheme, limited time budgets for 
successful intercepts, and the fact that the BMDS system 
will evolve over time.  All of the assumptions and 
constraints can, and some will, change over the course of 
the next several years.   
The nature of the threat that the BMDS will face will 
change over the evolution of the BMDS.  Just as the V2 
first introduced ballistic missile warfare in World War II, 
there is the possibility that another advancement in 
missile technology will radically change the way the BMDS, 
and thereby the C2BMC, must defend against this new threat.  
As these variables change, the recommendations for BMDS 
command structures may also change. 
                     2 Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), has a 
comprehensive description of the current conventional chain of command.  
There are exceptions to this type of chain of command and they will be 




A.  MISSILE DEFENSE 
President George W. Bush announced his decision for 
the United States to field the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System (BMDS) on 13 December 2001.3 The proliferation of 
missile technology has made it possible for almost any 
nation, or well financed terrorist organization, to buy 
missiles that can reach American citizens or American 
interests throughout the world.4  A credible missile defense 
is an imperative against nuclear blackmail in the future. 
The outline of the proposed capabilities for the 
initial BMDS showed that the system’s near-term objective 
was the ability to defeat a rogue state launch (five to ten 
missiles) or an unauthorized or limited objective attack 
(ULOA) by any adversary (twenty to fifty missiles).5  Given 
the number of ballistic missiles that Russia and China 
possess, the intent of the initial BMDS was not to be able 
to defeat all the missiles of an all-out attack by either 
of those two nations.  Future expansion of the BMDS will be 
a global missile defensive shield for the United States, 
her allies, and the world.  By 2007 the system will be able 
to target multiple missile launches throughout the world at 
any time. 
The command and control (C2) aspects, organization and 
operational control, of the system should not change much 
from the first iteration to the later iterations, for ease 
of operations, employment and cost effectiveness.  
                     3 www.whitehouse.gov.  Downloaded 22 September 2003. 
4 Warrick (2003) 
5 Wirtz et al (2001) p.335 
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Therefore, it is imperative that the C2BMC be robust enough 
to allow for the added systems and capacity that the system 
will evolve into over the years. 
B. INTRODUCTION TO MISSILE DEFENSE 
1. Hit-to-Kill Philosophy 
The hit-to-kill philosophy uses an interceptor, with a 
payload of one or more kill vehicles, launched against an 
inbound enemy ballistic missile.  The interceptor releases 
a kill vehicle to complete the engagement; the kill vehicle 
uses the kinetic energy generated by very high closing 
speeds between the kill vehicle and the inbound ballistic 
missile to destroy the inbound ballistic missile.  The 
closure speed (Vc) encountered as the two missiles race 
towards each other exceeds Mach 14, or over 7500 miles per 
hour.6  Intercepts at these speeds is a challenging problem.  
Early work in missile defense interceptor development 
focused on using small nuclear charges in the interceptors 
to destroy multiple inbound missiles.  Nuclear interceptors 
are currently used by Russia in their ABM system that is 
deployed around Moscow.  However, the use of nuclear 
interceptors is undesirable for from the perspective of the 
of consequence management: since nuclear debris and 
electromagnetic pulses could have a devastating impact on 
the nations proximate to the missile intercept.  The United 
States shifted its work on the interceptors to shaped 
charge interceptors in the late 1960s7. 
In theory, with shaped charge warheads the kill 
vehicle can determine the miss distance and direction very 
late in the engagement and detonate the warhead in the 
                     6 MDALink website.  Downloaded 12/16/03 
7 Graham (2001) p.10 
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direction of the attacking missile; the attacking missile 
would then pass through the debris cloud and itself be 
destroyed.  Shaped charges however can weigh almost as much 
as a nuclear warhead so there is no increase in speed or 
range using a shaped charge interceptor.8 
Hit-to-kill type interceptors have become the means of 
choice to destroy inbound ballistic missiles, by using the 
kinetic energy of the interceptor, as the ‘warhead,’ the 
interceptor must strike the attacking missile.  The perfect 
geometry for the interceptor is a head-to-head hit.  A 
head-to-head hit will destroy both missiles, but debris 
from the impact will fall to the earth at some point.  
Making the interceptor impact the inbound missile increases 
the complexity of the intercept, but as the first test of 
the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense interceptor (GMD) 
conducted in 1999 showed, hit-to-kill intercepts are 
technically feasible.9 
2. Non-Nuclear Interceptors 
Congressional legislation, within the Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, mandated the 
elimination of nuclear warheads on US interceptors for 
missile defense in 1999.10  Given the mandate to use 
something other than nuclear-armed interceptors, the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), the 
predecessor to MDA, chose kinetic (hit-to-kill) kill 
vehicles over the shaped charge kill vehicles.  Given the 
complexity of the shaped charge system the best way to 
ensure destruction of the ballistic missile is to keep the 
                     8 Ibid 
9 Graham (2001) p.188 
10 Thomas On-line Library. Senate Bill 1059 from the 106th Congress. 
Downloaded 3 December 2003 
8 
kill vehicle as simple, and as light, as possible therefore 
BMDO determined that a hit-to-kill vehicle was the best 
choice.11 
C. APPLICABLE TREATIES 
To understand the system-of-systems that BMDS will 
become, it is helpful to understand the treaties that the 
United States was bound to during the last three decades.  
These treaties were signed by the Soviet Union and the 
United States.  After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
the countries of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia 
inherited nuclear weapons as a result of the breakup of the 
Soviet Union.  The U.S. continued to abide by the 
applicable treaties as a ‘good faith’ gesture while working 
with the newly founded, or reformed, counties.  Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have become members of the United 
Nation’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear 
members and have destroyed, or transferred to Russia, all 
their nuclear materials.  Russia has maintained a number of 
strategic delivery systems, and is working to develop new 
systems, to retain their place as a strategic superpower. 
1. SALT I 
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were the 
first serious attempt at limiting the increasing number of 
ICBMs and SLBMs that both the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) and the United States were deploying.  In 
many ways the SALT was an interim measure, a holding 
pattern, while the two parties worked on the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty. 
The Soviet Union and the United States had widely 
different approaches to strategic deterrence.  The United 
                     11 Graham (2001). p.92 
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States’ more technologically advanced weapons were smaller 
in yield but far more accurate and reliable than the Soviet 
missiles.  The Soviets made up for the technological 
inferiority by having huge throw-weight weapons that would 
make up for accuracy through destructive power.  The 
asymmetry in the forces made equivalent limitations very 
problematic.  While SALT I failed to cover mobile ICBMs, 
the treaty was a milestone for strategic relations between 
the US and the USSR. 
2. SALT II 
The US Senate, in response to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1980, did not ratify the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks II Treaty.  However, both countries did 
abide by the treaty limitations for more than a decade.  
The goal of SALT II was to form a long-lasting 
comprehensive treaty that would put limits on a broad 
number of strategic offensive systems, by providing for an 
equal number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.  The 
aggregate number of delivery devices was limited to 2,400.  
There was an additional limit to the number of Multiple 
Independently targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) that could 
be deployed; that limit was 1,320.  Thus, SALT II was, like 
Apollo 13, a successful failure. 
3. START I 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I was complicated 
by the dissolution of the Soviet Union four months before 
the treaty was to enter into force.  Three and one half 
years after the original date, the treaty did enter into 
force between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the 
United States. 
10 
The strategic arsenals of the US and the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) states were reduced by over 30% under the START 
I Treaty.  START I also established prohibitions on 
training, testing, and modernization of certain types of 
weapons. 
4. START II 
The latest treaty between the United States and Russia 
concerning strategic arms was entered into force on 
December 5, 2001.  Its goal, like that of its predecessor 
(START I), was to further reduce the number of strategic 
arms that each side had to levels of between 30-45% of the 
original pre-START numbers.  The treaty did reduce the 
number of warheads, bombers, and MIRVs, but even further 
reductions have been unilaterally announced by both the 
United States and Russia since the treaty entered into 
force. 
5. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 
The Treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Systems entered into force on October 3, 1972.  The 
provisions of the treaty were such that each of the 
signatories, the United States and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, could only build two deployment sites, 
the placement of which were so restrictive that the 
combined systems could not defend the entire country.  
Later the treaty was amended to only one deployment area, 
around each signatory’s capitol.  The United States chose 
not to deploy a system around Washington DC and later 




On June 13, 2002 the United States unilaterally 
withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 
1972.  The move was much more substantive than most people 
first believed.  With the conditions that the ABM treaty 
imposed on the United States, a BMDS-type system could not 
be built.  Testing overlap between different range sensors 
or development of a strategic Command and was prohibited by 
the ABM treaty.12  After withdrawing from the ABM treaty the 
US was able to develop a strategic command and control 
system for the BMDS, it was at this point that the Battle 
Management Command and Control (BMC2) became the Command 
and Control Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) 
system. 
The entire point of the ABM treaty was that neither 
country would have been able to survive the counter attack 
from a first strike by the other.  The administration has 
determined that the United States cannot accept to take the 
‘first shot’ since it may not have a known adversary to 
retaliate in kind against.  Third party players (e.g. 
criminal organizations, terrorist groups, rebel insurgents 
who capture weapons) all have the capacity to acquire and 
launch ballistic missiles: if they do launch against the 
US, who then could the US retaliate against? 
D. SOVIET ABM SITE 
The Soviet Union deployed the A-35 ABM system, NATO 
codenamed ABM-1, around Moscow in 1978.  The system was 
modernized and upgraded several times through the early 
1990s; the current system is the A-135 (the NATO codename 
                     12 The ABM Treat of 1972 limited the type sensors that could track 
Ballistic Missiles during ballistic missile testing.  With the 
limitation removed one launch can be used to test several different 
systems with the BMDS system giving the US more research and 
demonstration opportunities. 
12 
is the ABM-3).  The original system was conceived in the 
late 1950s, but technical challenges delayed the deployment 
almost thirty years.  The system was modified in 
development to keep within the limits of the 1972 ABM 
treaty but with only 100 interceptors there was little hope 
that the system would fully protect the Soviet capital 
against an all out reprisal from the United States and 
NATO.13 
While the Russian interceptors have never been fired 
at real inbound ballistic missiles, the system is a 
successful deterrent.  The Russian system does protect 
Russia, and more particularly Moscow, from nuclear 
blackmail and coercion.  The Russian government kept the 
system and improved it over the years to provide a 
reasonable defense against smaller nuclear powers, 
including China.14 
E. CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS 
The proliferation of ballistic missiles has 
accelerated during the last two decades, in part due to the 
following three reasons.  The first reason is the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, which placed a large 
number of short to medium range missiles on the commercial 
and black markets and left many scientists, designers, and 
missile production workers unemployed and looking for work.  
The second reason is the increase in technology.  The rapid 
increase in technology has allowed almost any country with 
the economic ability to have a 20 to 30 million Dollar 
missile program the opportunity to develop and deploy 




short- to medium-range ballistic missiles.15  The CIA’s 
National Estimate of Foreign Missile Developments and 
Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015 shows that there is a 
possibility for up to four additional countries to deploy 
intermediate-range to intercontinental ballistic missiles 
in the next few years.16 
Russia, China, and India are the only countries that 
have ballistic missiles that can currently reach the United 
States.17  But that list is expected to grow in the next ten 
years.  Figure 1 shows potential threat countries and the 
ballistic missiles that they had as of 2001.  Most of the 
missiles are limited-range Short Range Ballistic Missiles 
(SRBMs), with ranges of up to 300 Km.  But with a little 
technical knowledge, Iraq welded two Scud B rocket motors 
together to create the Al Samond missile.  Even though the 
missile only had a payload of 500 pounds, its use as a 
terror weapon was well documented during Desert Storm.18 
The third key reason is the potential threats 
generated by converting Satellite Launch Vehicles (SLV) 
into ballistic missiles.  More than thirty countries have 
SLVs and space programs that could convert SLVs into to 
anything from short-range ballistic missiles into ICBMs.19  
Converting a SLV to a ballistic missile is a fairly simple 
operation in changing the flight characteristics of the 
missile.   
                     15 http://www.odci.gov/nic/other_missilethreat1999.html.  Downloaded 
12/17/03 
16 Ibid.  The countries were North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. 
17 McMahon (1997) p 231.  NATO and Friendly countries have been 
omitted from the list.  However the United Kingdom, France, and 
possibly Israel, have ICBMs that could reach US territories. 
18 McMahon (1997) p 57. 
19 Senate Hearings March 11, 2002. 
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Figure 1 Ballistic Missile Proliferation20 
 
 
                      20 Missile Defense Agency. Downloaded 11/3/03 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/BM2001.pdf.  
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1. North Korea Ballistic Missile Technology 
By altering the burn time of the rocket, trajectory, adding 
additional payload to slow the assent of the missile to 
keep it from breaking the Earth’s gravitational field, or 
altering the flight controls in flight.  SLV technology, 
while not exportable by US companies, is generally accepted 
as peaceful technological application, but with only a 
little modification it can become a terror vehicle. 
North Korea has a missile development program that has 
produced the Taepo Dong 2, a three-stage medium-range 
ballistic missile (MRBM).  While the exact range of the 
missile is unverified and a closely held secret of North 
Korea, estimates place the range at between 4,500Km to 
6,000Km.21  The North Korean’s have a robust testing and 
production facility in the vicinity of Hongwon, North 
Korea.  They have leveraged the technology from the Scud B 
and C missiles that they acquired from the Soviet Union 
and/or China to develop the indigenous Taepo Dong line of 
ballistic missiles. 
North Korea is also a leading black market exporter of 
ballistic missiles around the world.  Such exportation is 
against numerous international laws and UN agreements.  The 
North Koreans are willing to sell these weapons to the 
highest bidder.  In 2003 a North Korean merchant freighter 
was seized in India with what was reported to be a missile 
production facility in crates.22  The final destination of 
the cargo was most likely Iran or Iraq. 
 
                     21 http://www.odci.gov/nic/other_missilethreat1999.html. Downloaded 
17 December 2003 
22 Warrick (2003) 
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2. Potential WMD / WME Weapons Payloads 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Weapons of Mass 
Effects (WME) are payloads that would make the investment 
in long-range ballistic missiles worthwhile for a country.  
Figure 2 shows that one ton of high explosives would do 
relatively little damage to a major metropolitan area, 
aside from the fear factor, unless it happened to score a 
direct hit on a building.  Biological and chemical weapons 
provide a huge number of casualties per pound of payload.  
The number of deaths that would result from a ballistic 
missile with a WMD/WME warhead hitting a metropolitan area 
could easily dwarf the numbers that occurred during 9/11. 
 
 
Figure 2 Agent Use in Ballistic Missile Attacks.23 
 
F. INSTANCES OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY THAT COULD HAVE LED 
TO A STRATEGIC FIRST STRIKE 
While the initial system will not be as robust as 
subsequent iterations of the BMDS, the critical need for 
                     23 McMahon (1997) p.192 
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such a system is clearly warranted.  Although the risk of 
an unauthorized or limited objective attack against the US 
is low, several crises since the fall of the Berlin Wall 
have shown the need for a BMDS to defend against the 
possibility of such an attack.  This section will briefly 
outline three such instances that highlight how an 
unintentional limited nuclear war between the United States 
and Russia or the United States and China could have 
started. 
1. Tiananmen Square Protests and Chinese Government 
Reaction 
From the initial protests in Tiananmen Square to 
several months after the violent conclusion of the protests 
the status of Chinese nuclear forces was unclear to anyone 
outside the small circle of the Chinese national leadership 
(Communist Elite).  Even with the Chinese government 
assurances that the internal ‘crisis’ would not lead to a 
coup or a Chinese civil war, the status of the forces was 
in question.24  If a civil war had broken out, in to whose 
hands would the nuclear forces have fallen and what would 
be the loyalty of those forces.  The Chinese command and 
control system for nuclear weapons is largely a mystery in 
the West.  The Chinese have not published the actual 
safeguard mechanisms for nuclear weapons, so the world must 
rely on the Chinese government and military to keep the 
weapons controlled and impossible to launch without a 
verified launch order from Chinese national leadership.25 
While it is not argued that it is extremely unlikely that 
                     24 McMahon (2001) p.121 
25 While not finding a reference that identifies the Chinese 
government/military safety measure system for nuclear weapons is not a 
validation that it does not exist; it does represent that there is 
little knowledge on the subject. 
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the Chinese government would have launched a first strike 
against the United States, either side wishing to further 
their side’s political goals by involving the United States 
in a limited nuclear war could by have used a limited first 
strike with a few mobile ICBMs to reach a specific near-
term objective. 
2. 1991 Russian Coup Against Gorbachev 
During the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, the 
leaders of the coup did gain control of the nuclear command 
suitcase from Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev.26  The 
Soviet system of command and control for nuclear launch 
release authority was designed such that only with two 
different keys could a launch be authorized.  One of the 
keys is generated by the Secretary General, or one of the 
ranking Politburo members in the absence, or 
incapacitation, of the Secretary General (the political 
launch key), and the other key generated by the Chief of 
Staff of the service launching the weapon (i.e., Navy for 
SLBMs, Army for ICBMs, and Air Force for Bomber launch) 
(the military launch key).27  Neither side in the coup made 
any move to heighten the state of the nuclear forces or 
generate a launch key; and all three of the Chiefs of Staff 
(Army, Navy, and Air Force) all individually, and 
separately, determined that they would not honor any launch 
code if the political command key was generated and 
transmitted.28  While the Soviet safeguards against 
inadvertent launch were never truly tested, even the 
remotest possibility that the safeguard system could have 
been critically tested raises the following question. Why 
                     26 Senate Hearing (1991) p.8 
27 Ibid p.11 
28 Ibid p.9 
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should the United States rely on the Soviet safeguard 
system to work as our primary means of defense from 
ballistic missiles? 
3. 1993 Russian Reaction to Norwegian Satellite 
Launch 
Norway launched a weather satellite in January of 
1995.  According to documents from the Norwegian 
government, the Russian Foreign Ministry was advised of the 
launch and the nature of the satellite launch well in 
advance of the launch.29  However, the information provided 
to the Russian Foreign Ministry was never forwarded to the 
Russian Ministry of Defense or to the Russian defense 
command and control centers.  If the information was 
forwarded it was lost at both locations.  These command and 
control centers picked up the launch and incorrectly 
identified the rocket as an ICBM, possibly a US SLBM, 
headed for Russia.  The crises got to the point where 
President Boris Yeltsin and the Chief of the Russian 
General Staff, General Mikhail Kolesnikov had their nuclear 
command and control briefcases open and were conferring via 
the Russian Command and Control network.30  How close was 
the Russian government to launching a ‘retaliatory’ strike 
on the United States?  Most Russian and American sources 
discount the possibility of a Russian response to a single 
missile, but with the stability of the world in question 
should not the United States have a Missile Defense system 
to defeat such a strike? 
These three instances of political instability 
illustrate why the United States should not base defense 
against ballistic missiles on the aged principle of 
                     29 Graham (2001) p.212 
30 Graham (2001) p212 
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‘Mutually Assured Destruction.’  The development of a 
ballistic missile defensive system that can protect the 
United States and the world will prove that the world can 
be a safer place when so few cannot destroy so many. 
21 
III. DOCTRINE AND THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN  
A. NATIONAL DOCTRINE 
1. National Security Strategy 
The latest release of the National Security Strategy 
(NSS) was released in September of 2002.  The Bush 
Administration’s original release date for its first NSS 
was scheduled for the middle of September 2001.  The 
attacks of September 11, 2001 put the publication on hold 
and forced a major revision of national strategy and the 
supporting documents in light of the new Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT), the shift in America’s view of the world, 
and her focus.  The new NSS has made securing the United 
States against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) one of the 
nation’s top priorities.31  The road to securing the nation 
against WMD has multiple fronts, one of which is through 
the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). 
The NSS of September 2002 first articulated the idea 
of acting preemptively against terrorists, or governments, 
that are planning to harm the United States.32  Preemptive 
action against threats is a key to helping the BMDS achieve 
its goal of defending the United States.  The C2BMC must 
allow for directing and supporting preemptive operations as 
part of the initial development.  This support will add a 
level of complexity to the system, but the C2BMC must 
provide commanders with a single operational picture with 
respect to defense against WMD attack.  All aspects of 
missile defense, from intelligence to tracking to crisis 
operations and preemption must be resident in the C2BMC, 
                     31 NSS (2002) p.1 
32 NSS (2002) p.6 
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from the start, in order for the BMDS to accomplish its 
mission. 
2. Other National Doctrines 
Along with the publication of the National Security 
Strategy, two other capstone security documents were 
released.  Both the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
and the National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction further refine and document the United States’ 
position on WMD use against the nation. 
While WMD delivered by ballistic missiles is only one 
way that the United States could be attacked it is possibly 
the most dangerous, in terms of casualties and 
destruction.33  Therefore one of the main pillars of the 
defense against WMD is deterrence, as outlined in the 
National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.  This strategy does not specifically call out 
the BMDS as a devaluing agent for ballistic missiles, but 
with BMDS deployed the United States will no longer be tied 
to a massive response to ballistic missile attacks as the 
only ‘defensive’ measure. 
B. BMDS AND THE CURRENT UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 
The BMDS and the C2BMC need to integrate into the 
current Unified Command Plan (UCP) and be flexible enough 
to change when the national and military command structure 
change.  While overhauls to the structure of US military 
combat forces are rare, they do happen as the military 
innovates and modernizes.  The most radical changes to the 
UCP and the basic military command structure have to be 
approved by Congress, but the President has the authority 
                     33 McMahon (1997) p.192.  Airburst explosions will have the greatest 
dispersal of both fragments and agents and therefore could affect the 
largest areas. 
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to change missions and geographical AORs (Area of 
Responsibility) with only an Executive Order (EO).  The 
Unified Combatant Commanders (CC) are responsible for all 
military operations within their AOR, with only a couple of 
exceptions.  Should Missile Defense be one of these 
exceptions?  This chapter investigates the command 
relationships between the CCs and offers suggestions for 
command and control within the C2BMC. 
1. USSTRATCOM 
Under the current Unified Command Plan, USSTRATCOM 
(United States Strategic Command) has the primary 
responsibility for providing integrated missile defense to 
the United States and her military.34  This responsibility 
ultimately spans many layers of defensive weapons from the 
PATRIOT batteries that support Army Divisions to the Ground 
Based Interceptors designed to kill inbound missiles in 
their cruise phase (exoatmospheric) of flight.  This 
responsibility also includes all the collection assets--
ground based, airborne radars, and satellite vehicles--
which provide first launch indications and tracking of 
attacking missiles. 
The C2BMC structure will be the responsibility of, and 
controlled by, Commander USSTRATCOM and as such will 
require total awareness of all airborne entities worldwide 
and the ability to integrate pictures from the Joint Battle 
Management Command and Control (JC2BMC) capabilities group, 
being developed by USJFCOM (United States Joint Forces 
Command).  To assist USSTRATCOM with this responsibility, 
command of NORAD has been shifted from USNORTHCOM (United 
States Northern Command) to a co-command between USSTRATCOM 
                     34 http://www.stratcom.af.mil/ Downloaded 1/10/04 
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and USNORTHCOM.  NORAD, whose primary mission is the 
defense of North America against air-breathing entities, 
also monitors all the objects in orbit and that are 
launched to orbit.  NORAD has played a role as the military 
command center that could direct military forces after a 
nuclear first strike since very early in the Cold War.  The 
other command centers capable of directing forces from a 
hardened and secure site are the National Military Command 
Center (NMCC), the Alternate NMCC in Pennsylvania, and the 
airborne command centers (NECAP and TACMO aircraft).  The 
continued use of NORAD for BMDS launch and C2 is a common 
sense way to limit the cost and integration problems of 
introducing a new weapons system to the US arsenal. 
2. USNORTHCOM 
Through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with 
USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM is currently designated as the 
launch control authority for the GMDs that will be 
deployed.  The idea behind the MOA was that the defense of 
North America was part of the charter of USNORTHCOM and as 
such USNORTHCOM was the best CC to exercise launch 
authority over the GMDs.35  Also, the proximity of 
USNORTHCOM’s Headquarters to the NORAD Operations Center in 
Cheyenne Mountain made the chain of command less 
disjointed.  However, USNORTHCOM is not the Combatant 
Commander that should be responsible for missile defense.  
That job needs to be performed by USSTRATCOM. 
3. Regional Combatant Commanders 
Although both USSTRATCOM and USNORTHCOM seem to 
control the national architecture for missile defense, each 
of the Regional CCs has a Title 10, USC, Section 164 
responsibility to defend the United States forces and                      35 Interview with Mr. Caffel (2003) 
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interests in their AOR.36  That requirement creates within 
every CC AOR a missile defense architecture that provides 
for the defense of US forces and interests.  Normally, the 
missile defense responsibility is delegated to the JFACC 
(Joint Forces Air Component Commander) for standing Joint 
Force Structures (i.e., Korean Peninsula) or the Air 
Force’s service component commander for the CC’s AOR. 
It is possible that two geographically proximate CCs 
will have to manage the short-range ballistic missile 
defense laterally across the two AORs.  During Desert Storm 
the defense of Israel was one such instance.  Israel 
geographically belonged to USEUCOM (US European Command) 
and the main battlefields of Desert Storm belonged to 
USCENTCOM (US Central Command).  The lessons of theater 
missile defense in Desert Storm will be discussed in detail 
later.  However, this command relationship (difficult 
delineation between supported and supporting CC) has the 
potential to ‘muddy the waters’ with respect to C2BMC 
launch authority and prioritized defense areas. 
The necessary involvement of all of the above 
mentioned Combatant Commanders in missile defense has 
increased the complexity of the BMDS and the C2BMC.  The 
next section will discuss how, using existing doctrine, the 
missile defense C2 can be tailored to increase efficiencies 
and reduce the complexity of the operations of the BMDS. 
C. CURRENT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
The current Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Doctrine is 
based, like most operational (offensive) doctrines, on 
apportionment and pre-planning.  The key to TMD against a 
limited range threat (up to 1000Km, like a Scud or Scud 
                     36 United States Law Title 10, USC, Section 164 
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variant) is target analysis from the enemy perspective and 
possible interceptor positional analysis from the friendly 
perspective.  Placing PATRIOT batteries in line with 
anticipated launch azimuths creates lines of fire that can 
reduce TBM effectiveness with limited anti-TBM assets.37  
TMD doctrine places great emphasis on attacking the TBMs 
before they are used in combat.38  On the world stage, while 
preemption is an option, it is not a realistic option for 
countering all possible first strike scenarios.  Therefore 
the United States must proceed with a good ‘in-flight’ 
defense from ballistic missiles. 
While the TMD doctrine is good for limited area and 
regional crises, there needs to be a cogent doctrine for 
defining the C2 for all missile defenses.  Given the 
possibilities of damage and casualties as shown in Figure 2 
of Chapter I, apportionment of missile defense forces 
against targets no longer makes sense.  The US will likely 
never possess enough missile defense forces to launch 
multiple interceptors against every inbound missile, so 
battle management and command and control of the limited 
resources become increasingly important to the success of 
the BMDS. 
D. BMDS COMMAND AND CONTROL 
There are three distinct layers of missile defense.  
The first layer and most prolific threat is, as discussed 
above, Theater Missile Defense and short-range ballistic 
missiles.  The second is medium-range and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles, with ranges from 1000Km to 
5500Km.  This range could affect the entire AOR of a 
                     37 Joint Pub 3-01.5 p.III-2 
38 Joint Pub 3-01.5 p.I-3 
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Combatant Commander, and might affect several CCs’ AORs.  
This level can also be thought of as the Regional missile 
defense arena.  The final layer, and perhaps the most 
dangerous, is ICBM range missiles, which are generally 
accepted to be missiles that have a range in excess of 
5500Km.39  This layer can also be thought of as the global 
missile defense layer. 
 
Figure 3 Levels Of Missile Defense C2 
 
Figure 3 shows that each level of missile defense has 
overlap with the adjoining layer(s).  The C2BMC will have 
to not only direct operations within one layer but all the 
layers simultaneously.  Managing the ‘in between’ areas, as 
shown in black in Figure 3, is key to maintaining effective                      39 Siegel (2001) p.15 
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C2 over the entire BMDS.  The use of one type of 
interceptor vice a different type of interceptor from a 
different ‘level’ may determine the long term success of 
the defense.  For example, if too many interceptors were 
used within one level, the missile defense forces may 
become depleted of assets and overwhelming the defenses may 
become feasible for the adversary.  So the C2BMC must have 
the intelligence and missile defense forces operational 
status (i.e., active sensors, weapons remaining…) necessary 
to fight the defense in the most efficient manner.  
Both Sun Tzu and Carl Von Clausewitz espoused the need 
for clear chains of command and unified commands where at 
all possible.40  ‘Unity of Command’ is listed as one of 
‘…the bedrock[s] of US military doctrine’ within Joint 
Publication 1 and is defined as follows: 
Unity of command means that all forces operate 
under a single commander with the requisite 
authority to direct all forces employed in 
pursuit of a common purpose.41 
To elaborate on the doctrinal definition, unity of command 
helps to eliminate confusion within the forces caused by 
having more than one commander or having more than one 
chain of command. 
The current design for BMDS C2 as outlined above does 
not have unity of command as a central characteristic.  If 
unity of command were stressed in BMDS, the Combatant 
Commander with cognizance over the system would also be the 
supported commander.  Some may argue that through the use 
of technology both unity of command and clear COCs are no 
longer necessary since technology can overcome span of                      40 Sun Tzu (1963) and Von Clausewitz (1984) 
41 Joint Publication 01 (2000) p. III-7 
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control problems.  But the use of technology has not in the 
past produced gains in a commander’s span of control.  The 
key to developing C2BMC command architecture is to 
eliminate the span of control issue by identifying the 
informational flow and couple that with the appropriate 
decision making aids and processes to allow for the 
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IV. MERGING THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE AND BALLISTIC 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
A. BMDS AND C2BMC ORGANIZATION 
Using the BMDS network configuration developed by the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s BMDS Working Group, each 
regional Combatant Commander (CC) will have local C2BMC 
node which will feed into the rest of the C2BMC nodes and 
receives data from the local sensor network and the local 
weapons network (See Figure 4)42.  The local sensor network 
will also receive data from sensor networks in the other 
regions.  A regional weapons network will not talk to other 
weapons network, but only to the local sensor network for 
track information and the local C2BMC node for weapons 
assignment information.  The C2BMC system of nodes will 
fully communicate between all the C2BMC nodes to maximize 
weapon assignment efficiency and increase the probability 
of kill against an inbound ballistic missile and minimize 
weapon usage.43  The sensor networks will run largely 
autonomously sharing data and cueing messages without 
operator interference.  Since all the C2BMC nodes will 
interconnect, not necessarily by an all-points connection, 
the system can be run in ‘theater’ mode where each regional 
CC will have control of the missile defense within their 
AOR or the more efficient ‘global’ mode where command of 
all the missile defense forces is controlled by USSTRATCOM 
either through CMOC (Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, 
the NORAD Command Post) or some other command post. 
                     42 For more on the BMDS network architecture see Caffall (2002) and 
Babbitt and Miklaski (2003) 
43 Babbitt and Miklaski (2003) p.42 
32 
Such a regionally designed network in theory could 
greatly increases the efficiency of the network with 
respect to missile usage and provides the regional CCs and 
USSTRATCOM with a mixed use of both TMD and global missile 
defense assets.  This inherent flexibility also allows the 
command of individual nodes to be shifted, up or down the 
chain of command, during crises and hostilities.  In the 
remainder of the thesis, it will be argued that the 
preferred method for C2 of the BMDS will be for a single 
commander to ‘defend’ the globe using assets that are 
positioned in other Combatant Commander’s AORs, with 
advisory messages passed around to the other C2BMC nodes.  
The back-up method will be for each C2BMC node to operate 
as an independent missile defense system and communicate 
its intentions to adjacent C2BMC nodes, and the global 
command C2BMC node, if possible. 
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on the 
development of BMDS states that the human operator granting 
permission to engage an inbound missile is time-critical.44  
The concept of operations for the C2BMC must assume that 
the President will grant weapons release authority down the 
chain of command (COC) to a level appropriate to allow for 
engagement of the enemy missile.45  This thesis assumes that 
the appropriate level is at least at the Combatant 




                     44 GAO (2003) p 7 




Figure 4 Theoretical C2BMC Sensor Network46 
 
 
Rules of engagement (ROE), a cornerstone to effective 
high tempo combat operations, must be developed and refined 
over development of the BMDS.  Each of the serial ROE 
statements must be tested against war game scenarios to 
validate the ease of use for the rule and the applicability 
of the rule to various scenarios.  ROE can be thought of as 
the bedrock on which the rest of the BMDS will be built and 
while ROE can change over time if is paramount that human 
input into the system is maintained.  A well designed and 
articulated ROE will allow for the delegation of missile                      46 Adapted from Babbitt and Miklaski (2003) 
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launch authority from the highest levels (i.e, the 
President and Secretary of Defense) to USSTRATCOM and most 
likely down to the watch staff of the JTF. 
B. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
Joint Publication 3-01.5, Joint Doctrine for Theater 
Missile Defense, sets the doctrinal bar for how Joint Task 
Force (JTF) Commanders should employ their forces to defend 
against enemy ballistic missile operations.  Although Joint 
Pub 3-01.5 includes all missiles types under the same 
doctrine (cruise, air-to-surface, and ballistic), the 
concepts for defending against them is the same.  While 
concentration in development of the BMDS is focused on 
ballistic missiles the same methodology will be used when 
the BMDS is responsible for countering all missiles. 
There are four principal operational elements of 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD).  They are Passive 
Operations, Active Operations, Attack Operations, and C4I.47  
All of the areas that serve as keys to Theater level 
missile defense have a direct relationship with similar 
keys to regional and global missile defense, the two higher 
levels of the BMDS.  The following sections describe each 
element at the TMD level and derive what that element might 
entail at the new higher levels of the BMDS. 
1. Passive Operations 
Passive Operations has four principal measures: 
tactical warning, reduced targeting effectiveness, reducing 
vulnerability, and recovery and reconstruction.  Of these 
only tactical warning and reducing vulnerability have 
direct relationships with what needs to be done at the 
regional and global missile defense.  The other three are 
                     47 Joint Pub 3-01.5 (1996) p.I-3 
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militarily relevant but difficult to accomplish with the 
threat missile range and accuracy.  For example, there is 
no way to deceive an enemy about the position of major 
cities, ports, power grid locations, etc.  Reconstruction 
and recovery will be the job of FEMA and other departments 
of the federal government, if the BMDS should fail. 
Tactical Warning is an element that will be used at 
all levels of missile defense.  In the Theater level of 
operations the JFC is responsible for a ‘theater event 
reporting system’ to disseminate warnings to the military 
and civilian populations.  Both the regional and global 
commanders will need to furnish the same information to the 
groups under their protection. 
Training civilian authorities and NBC defense forces 
are key aspects to reducing vulnerabilities.  While the 
BMDS organization or MDA will not directly conduct the 
training, it will fall to a joint Department of 
Defense/Department of Homeland Security (DoD/DHS) task 
force to detect, protect, and decontaminate, if necessary.  
The BMDS testing results and information about the system 
will also be crucial in helping create a positive global 
understanding of the system. 
2. Active Operations 
Joint Pub 3-01.5 as defines active operations in TMD 
as:  
to protect selected assets and forces from attack 
by destroying TM airborne launch platforms and/or 
TM’s in flight.48 
                     48 Ibid p. III-7 
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Defense in Depth is also stressed as a way to ensure that 
the defending forces have “multiple opportunities to 
negate” inbounds ballistic missiles.49   
One of the key tenets of Active Operations is that the 
operations should be centrally commanded and decentrally 
executed.  This tenet is in keeping with the vision of the 
Unified Action Armed Forces Doctrine and with the realities 
that the timing constraints often times will necessitate 
direct launch authorizations from the highest levels of 
command to the individual batteries or ships.  Once the 
BMDS is fully operational, the element of resource 
management will become a management issue and only through 
careful planning and centralized tasking will the system 
respond to an all-out attack effectively. 
3. Attack Operations 
Attack Operations occur during the hostilities phase 
of operations.  In a TMD role, the easiest way to defeat 
ballistic missiles is to destroy them while they are on the 
ground or in garrison.  During Desert Storm an enormous 
number of sorties were generated during the ‘Great Scud 
Hunt.’50  In the future, the role of the C2BMC will be to 
act as the intelligence clearing house for ballistic 
missiles and their launchers.  Using actionable 
intelligence, the number of dedicated sorties for attack 
operations should be cut by over half. 
                     49 Ibid p. III-7 
50 Trainor (1995) p. 238.  The exact numbers are difficult to assess 
since the Airborne Command Element (ACE) could, and did, redirect 
missions airborne, but estimates are that between 2 and 5% of sorties 
generated from the start of the air campaign to the ceasefire in March 
were for the ‘Great Scud Hunt.’  There were over 41,000 sorties total 
during the 8 week war. 
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The NSS of 2002 set forth the policy of pre-emptive 
strikes against enemy forces, but it would be politically 
difficult to attack a country with ballistic missile 
launchers outside the hostility phase of a conflict.  
However, planning for attack operations must be continually 
updated to allow the RCC and USSTRATCOM the ability to 
launch into the hostility phase of an operation and be 
poised to destroy an enemy’s ballistic missile arsenal. 
4. C4I 
Current guidance for Command, Control, Communications, 
Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) within TMD is to use 
“existing joint and Service C4I systems and resources.”51  
Using existing C4I systems may have worked in the past 
where there were fewer threat missiles in the battle space, 
but as the numbers of and ranges of missiles increases the 
C4I systems that support missile defense will have to be 
dedicated to missile defense.  With the timing constraints 
that missile defense has, it would be unreasonable to 
require that TMD Command, Control, and Communications (C3) 
ride on the back of current C3 systems that are generally 
running overburdened as it is.  As mentioned in Chapter II, 
the BMDS will attempt to hit a missile with a missile.  The 
tracking and sensor data alone would push the military’s 
other C3 systems beyond their capabilities.  The C2BMC is 
the C2 system that is the basis of BMDS, with 
communications added as a way for the nodes to work 
together.  With the new system to control the components of 
the BMDS, new architecture and process need to be developed 
to increase the efficiency of the BMDS. 
                     51 Joint Pub 3-01.5 (1996) p. III-14 
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Planning is another aspect of TMD that will lend 
itself to expansion under the BMDS.  The Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is key to planning for 
the worst scenario that the BMDS is likely to see.  The IPB 
for missile defense will illustrate what countries have 
ballistic missiles, the possible targets of those missiles, 
and the intercept timelines necessary for a successful 
engagement.  The intelligence from the heat signature is 
then matched to DSP, or its follow-on system Space Based 
Infrared System (SBIRS), track to allow for rapid typing of 
the inbound missile and its targeting.  The existing TMD 
Doctrine has little in the way of how to integrate the 
existing JTF J2 (Intelligence) into the TMD mission.  Under 
the BMDS, Intelligence is critical for the Regional CCs and 
USSTRATCOM to deploy missile defense forces and defend US 
forces and civilians around the world as well as the 
territory of the Untied States. 
C. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Currently the only other country that operates a large 
missile defense organization is Russia.  Russia operates a 
legacy Soviet missile defense system that is designed to 
protect Moscow and the surrounding areas from a missile 
attack.  However, using the Soviet system for command and 
control as a model for the C2 of the BMDS is flawed for the 
following reasons.  The Soviet model for C2 was very rigid 
and did not allow for any flexibility or originality of 
thought, had a penchant for KGB involvement in strategic 
operations, and never aligned itself to a single combined 
arms model.52  The old Soviet, now mainly Russian, C2 model 
and the United States’ C2 model have never been truly 
                     52 Cimbala (1987) p. 35, 157, and 159 
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compatible and comparison would not be appropriate for the 
evolving BMDS. 
1. NORAD’s Informational Requirement 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was 
created in the late 1950’s to detect and defend the United 
States and Canada from airborne threats, originally bombers 
from the USSR.  Since its inception, NORAD has been tasked 
with additional responsibilities, including tracking ICBMs, 
tracking and cataloguing all space vehicles, and after 9/11 
a renewed and increased focus on air traffic within the US.  
With the threat of ICBM attack from several nations, NORAD 
has become the national early warning center responsible 
for directing response options to attacks.  With the 
deployment of BMDS and the realignment of NORAD’s echelons 
above command structure, NORAD will add the responsibility 
of the global C2 center for missile defense, as well as its 
current other missions. 
Given the history of NORAD, a command developed during 
the Cold War and one of the executers of the Single 
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), it is no wonder that 
the level of confidence required of and from information is 
extremely high.  In Pearson’s book about the World Wide 
Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), he states 
that there were over 3700 missile display conferences in 
one 18-month period in the early 1980’s.53  These missile 
display conferences were held every time that one of the 
ballistic missile early warning sensors detected anything 
that could not be typed.  With the high reliability that 
the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) is 
responsible for, the granularity of the information needs 
                     53 Pearson (2000) p.245 
40 
to be of almost fire control quality.  It will not be 
enough for the CMOC to receive a track from the C2BMC with 
the parametric data removed.  This level of detail will 
increase the messaging requirements for the C2BMC, but such 
granularity is required by the commander, and the staff, 
when execution of the missile defense OPLAN is required.  
The missile defense OPLAN will be discussed in Chapter V. 
2. Theater Level Defense 
Desert Storm provides the best example of a well-
tested missile defense system; it used modern doctrine, had 
a reliable C2 structure to pass information and orders, had 
a dispersed force structure, and was attacked.  There have 
been very few crises that place both ballistic missiles and 
missile defense agents in the same battlespace, and few 
crises where ballistic missiles have actually been 
launched.  The other case study that could be used is the 
Korean Peninsula TMD organization or the TMD organization 
used during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Since neither of 
these architectures have been critically tested the 
efficiency of the systems should be judged as suspect.  
Also their classifications, due to the ongoing nature of 
operations, place them outside the scope of this thesis.  
The next section will use Desert Storm as an example of 
what theater level missile defense (TMD) according to 
doctrine could look like deployed and operational.   
3. Global Defense 
The BMDS system will eventually be able to detect, 
track, evaluate, assign, engage, and evaluate engagement 
over 5000 tracks simultaneously around the entire globe.54  
It is doubtful that the BMD system will ever have that many 
interceptors to assign a one-to-one interceptor to missile                      54 Interview with Mr. Caffall 11/16/2003 
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ratio.  However, this number of simultaneous tracks 
possible shows that the C2 of the BMDS is critical, since 
at some level the decision may have to be made to engage 
one target and not another target or to allocate two or 
more interceptors against one target and not another.  The 
ability to manage this conflict will have to be centrally 
located to best devise how the missile defense battle 
should be fought.  As previously discussed, the speed of 
the decision making will also have to be so quick that 
decisions will have to be self-evident (i.e., ROE built 
into the C2BMC displays to allow the operator to increase 
decision speeds).  Centralized control and decentralized 
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V. DESIGN OF THE BMDS COMMAND AND CONTROL 
ARCHITECTURE 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the fundamental 
key to command and control for the BMDS and specifically 
the C2BMC is flexibility and adaptability.  The flexibility 
in the system must be designed from the ground up.  
USSTRATCOM, the overall commander for global missile 
defense, needs to be able to use the system in a number of 
different ways.  From the highly centralized manner where 
all interceptor launches are assigned and authorized from 
STRATCOM Headquarters (or possibly the CMOC) to a highly 
decentralized ‘Weapons Free’ mode where every missile 
defense agent has the authority and responsibility to take 
a shot at any ballistic missile that is in range of their 
interceptors.55  The ‘Weapons Free’ mode would be an extreme 
scenario, so it is important to allow the commander to 
tailor the BMDS system as necessary and for all 
eventualities.  The best and easiest way to manage a system 
that will be as complex as the BMDS is to allow extensive 
flexibility in command and control. 
A. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES 
As designated by the President, the Commander 
USSTRATCOM has the overall responsibility for global 
missile defense.  Whether or not STRATCOM is the supporting 
or supported command in that role is still to be decided, 
but to achieve the C2 necessary to successfully intercept 
missiles, USSTRATCOM should be the supported commander.56  
                     55 ‘Weapons Free’ is defined as any contact not positively identified 
as friendly must be engaged by US/Allied forces if those forces are 
able to engage. 
56 JP 1 and JP 3-0, chapters II and III, have good discussions on 
supported and supporting commands as it pertains to Unity of Effort.  
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By granting USSTRATCOM the role of supported Combatant 
Commander for all aspects of missile defense, it will allow 
a single staff organization the duties of planning and 
reviewing supporting commanders’ plans with respect to 
missile defense.  All geographic CCs will have a theater 
plan that will propose positioning of forces to best detect 
and interdict short- to medium-range missiles based on 
guidance provided by the USSTRATCOM staff that will be able 
to merge all the theater and regional plans into one 
cohesive global plan.  These plans will have to be 
developed prior to the execution of any intercepts.  The 
Joint Staff has created a process that produces plans for 
likely scenarios; that process is called joint operations 
planning.  Joint operations planning consists of two 
planning processes, the deliberate planning process and the 
crisis action planning process. 
1. Deliberate Planning 
USSTRATCOM will be tasked by the Chairman Joint Chief 
of Staff (CJCS) to provide Operational Plans (OPLANs) and 
Concept Plans (CONPLANS) to the Joint Staff that show how 
the BMDS will be used against the highest possibility 
threats.57  This deliberate planning process will allow all 
the CCs to review, comment, and help solidify STRATCOM’s 
plan for attack operations, active and passive operations.  
The OPLANS generated will primarily deal with intercept 
geometries, detection plans, and interceptor launch windows 
for threat ballistic missiles from adversarial countries 
                     
Just as a JTF can and will designate supported and supporting roles the 
NCA through the CJCS will designate them for cross and multi CC 
relationships. 
57 JP 5-0 (1995) p x.  Chapter III of JP 5-0 has a complete 
description of deliberate planning, what is involved with a 
OPLAN/CONPLAN and what the Joint Staff requires from the CC. 
45 
thereby allowing for smoother control of missile defense 
forces during times of crisis and while under attack. 
2. Crisis Action Planning or Operations 
Crisis Action Planning (CAP) will normally not be 
applicable to missile defense.  The reason is that the CAP 
process is designed to be a necked-down version of the 
deliberate process that takes hours or days vice months or 
years.58  Missile defense is not measured in days or even 
hours.  Rather, it is measured in minutes and seconds.  If 
there is not a solid plan as to how to engage a missile, 
the duty will fall to the C2BMC watch staff to fight the 
US, and possibly allied, missile defense forces against the 
threat.  If there is not a specified OPLAN for a missile 
defense event, then the reactions becomes procedural-based 
from the baseline engagement and little extra human 
involvement will be needed or desired. 
Both the deliberate planning process and the CAP are 
designed to produce plans for force movements, force 
positioning, and possible engagements.  Missile defense is 
unique in that the forces need to be in place prior to 
advent of hostilities.  So decisions to deploy missile 
defense forces will have to be made well in advance.  If a 
particular intercept has not been pre-planned (e.g., 
geometry, type of missile, intended targets) and pre-




                     58 JP 5-0 (1995) p. III-10.  The deliberate planning timeline is 
between 18-24 months per plan and crisis action planning can be done in 
as little as 8-12 hours for a small reaction force strike or special 
operations event. 
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B. C2BMC AS A C2 ENABLER 
Timing in missile defense is everything.  Not since 
the advent of the airplane has the tempo of operations 
increased to such a degree.  The Clausewitzian ‘Fog of War’ 
as it applies to the ability to command forces in the field 
has always been an obstacle for effective employment of 
forces.  The C2BMC will need to provide the commander, the 
commander’s staff, the supporting CCs, the supporting CC’s 
staffs, and the forces in the field a common missile 
defense picture.  The C2BMC will have to provide an array 
of information that is unprecedented. If the C2BMC can 
provide the correct picture to the correct operator, the 
system will be performing its job superbly.59  The problem 
however is to provide enough different displays that can be 
molded to allow for efficient human interaction without 
making the overall system cumbersome. 
There is a huge effort on-going within the defense 
establishment to create a baseline for interoperable 
situational awareness pictures.  These interoperable 
pictures, or displays, will provide ‘shared’ Situational 
Awareness (SA) between all the forces increasing lethality 
and decreasing own forces vulnerability.  The Navy’s 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), the Army’s Land 
Warrior project, the Air Force’s Theater Battle Management 
Core System (TBMCS), and the USJFCOM effort to merge all 
these programs, plus all the current military data links, 
into a single system (JC2BMC) show the potential of 
                     59 Johnson et al (1989) p. 60.  By ‘correct’ I refer to the idea that 
an individual will have little time to sort through several different 
types of displays to discover the one piece of information that is 
necessary for optimized use of their particular missile defense system.  
The Commander USSTRATCOM, the THADD operator in field, and the GMD 
operators will all have different information needs, hence different 
display options as well. 
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eliminating, or at least reduce, the ‘Fog of War.’  The 
C2BMC must also be part of this merging of pictures to 
ensure that C2BMC is not relegated to the periphery of the 
military. 
C. CREATION OF OVERARCHING MISSILE DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
1. Desert Storm Architecture and Lessons Learned 
During Desert Shield, the buildup to Desert Storm 
(DS), PATRIOT missile batteries were deployed from EUCOM 
AOR (specifically from West Germany) to Saudi Arabia, and 
later to the outskirts of Israel’s two major cities.  This 
deployment created the first co-Combatant Commander missile 
defense architecture deployed and created.  While in the 
Cold War planning and strategy, this co-CC relationship was 
the exception to the rule.  After the Cold War having two, 
or more Combatant Commanders involved in a crisis seems to 
be closer to the new rule.60 
Much of the foundation of theater missile defense 
doctrine was developed as a result of the lessons learned 
from the employment of the PATRIOT batteries during Desert 
Storm.  While the success or failure of the PATRIOT 
batteries to defeat the relatively slow-flying, short-range 
Scud is debatable, the C2 that allowed the information to 
be passed from the overhead satellites to the individual 
batteries in only a couple of minutes is not debatable.  
The C2 architecture used worked well during Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS). 
Here is a trace of the C2 that allowed the coalition 
to conduct military operations with little regard for the 
‘terror weapons’ as General Schwarzkopf called the Scud 
                     60 Priest (2003) p.73.  As described in Chapter II the world hot 
spots, with the exception of the Korean peninsula, seem to be 
straddling boarders of CC AORs. 
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missile being launched from Iraq.61  The DSP satellites were 
maneuvered to be able to detect launches throughout 
USCENTCOM’s AOR.  At the time of DS/DS, there was not a 
direct feed from the satellites to any CC AOR.  Even EUCOM 
who was the most likely candidate for a short- to medium-
range ballistic missile attack had to rely on information 
being forwarded from the US.62  JTAGS (Joint Tactical Ground 
Station, fielded in early 1997) was developed as a result 
of this lesson learned in TMD.  The DSP signal was sent 
from the ground station in Colorado to the AOR by a double 
satellite bounce.63  After the signal was received by the 
Combatant Commander’s HQ the signal then had to be 
rebroadcast to the batteries in the field that might be 
able to intercept incoming the Scud. 
One of the problems of the system was that the 
information was passed by voice once it got to the AOR.  C3 
(Command, Control, and Communications) has improved greatly 
since the early 1990’s and now that JTAGS is a deployable 
unit the information can be passed via JTIDS (Joint 
Tactical Information Distribution System) directly from the 
JTAGS unit to the PATRIOT batteries, which reduces both 
time to deliver the message and errors in voice reporting. 
C2BMC can improve the existing relay of information 
from the sensor to the shooter by incorporating the 
existing weapons platforms into the applicable nets.  Also, 
                     61 Gordon (1995) p.235 
62 Ibid p. 235 
63 Since the distance between Colorado and the Desert Storm AOR 
(Saudi Arabia and Israel) was so great, a single satellite bounce would 
not interconnect the two.  Nominally the first bounce would have gone 
from the US to Central Europe, using a GEO satellite and then re-
bounced off another GEO satellite to CENTCOM’s AOR.  Latency of the 
signal would be nominally less than 2 seconds from original 
transmission from the DSP ground station to the CCHQ. 
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by passing digital track and cueing data between platforms 
the accuracy of the data will be maintained throughout the 
kill chain. 
 
2. False Alarm Rate 
The three-layer model; global, regional, and theater 
level missile defense that was introduced in Chapter II has 
a problem when a single false alarm rate is applied to the 
entire system.  The timeliness of information is critical 
to the two lower levels of the missile defense model.  The 
decision timing of the intercept for a short- or medium-
range ballistic missile intercept is such that the 
interceptor must be launched within two to three minutes of 
the first detection of the inbound or the missile will be 
out of parameters for a successful intercept.64  NORAD’s 
role in national defense necessitates highly reliable data 
be delivered to national leaders at the expense of overall 
timing.65.  The use of multiple false alarm rates within one 
system is not as large a problem as it might seem.  If all 
the systems have the same data, shared over the Sensor Net, 
the different levels can apply different rules to initiate 
actions.  So while the National level is awaiting a refined 
launch and impact points for the ICBM raids, the lower two 
levels can be working on firing solutions and launch on 
SRBMs and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). 
The Theater and Regional levels of the BMDS would need 
to use cueing data from the sensor network to help the 
onboard radar systems on the PATRIOT, THAAD, and AEGIS 
systems.  These platforms would have to compute a ‘local’ 
                     64 Interview with Mr. Caffall 11/16/2003. 
65 Pearson (2000) p.245 
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track before the system would allow for interceptor launch, 
in current system implementations.  So these systems could 
accept a significantly higher false alarm rate, and can 
even help in refining flight data for the higher levels. 
The use of a GMD against any target would be a serious 
matter and would require high level of assurances to 
release the interceptor.  Therefore, the false alarm rate 
for the C2BMC at that level has to be almost zero.  
However, the sensor network could maintain a higher 
sensitivity to ensure there were no untargeted ballistic 
missiles or missed detections.  The problem of missed 
detections would also need to be studied to ensure that the 
system maintained a zero missed detection record.  The low 
false alarm rate has to be balanced with a fast track 
development speed since SLBMs would give the system almost 
no time to react since they use depressed trajectories and 
are much closer to the potential targets. 
3. JFACC or JFMDCC 
The JFACC is the component commander that is normally 
assigned the responsibilities of planning and directing 
execution of TMD.66  While it is logical to assign the JFACC 
these responsibilities, it has always been a secondary role 
for the JFACC and its staff.  In the future, missile 
defense actions and responsibilities will expand as the 
threat does.  The duties of the JFACC staff with respect to 
missile defense will easily exceed the resources and 
talents of the JFACC staff.  While adding to the JTF 
organization could be a large step in redefining the way 
the American military fights our wars, the need for a 
JFMDCC (Joint Forces Missile Defense Component Commander) 
                     66 JP 3-01.5 p. III-11 
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type of command will arise at either the theater level or 
regional level. 
The need for a separate missile defense organization 
has been shown in Chapter IV.  In fielding the BMDS and the 
C2BMC, MDA has determined that using existing C2 
communications ‘pipes’ will not allow for the 
responsiveness required to effectively manage the missile 
defense assets and defeat incoming missiles, whose targets 
may number in the hundreds.  By fielding the C2BMC, the 
door is open to allow a direct chain of command (COC) for 
missile defense from the highest levels (USSTRATCOM) to the 
individual batteries in the field.  While the Title 10 
responsibility of the CCs to defend their troops has not 
diminished, the reality of the timing and decision speed of 
missile defense necessitates the use of a dedicated COC to 
allow for timely and accurate engagements.  USSTRATCOM 
should be the commander for missile defense and NORAD 
should act as the national executive agent for operational 
missile defense. 
Having a Functional Combatant Commander operate within 
a geographic CC AOR is not entirely without precedent.  
Recently, United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) has been given the authority to conduct ‘Special 
Operations Missions’ in a geographic AOR using Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) teams while under the operational 
control (OPCON) of United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM).67  USSOCOM’s leeway in conducting operations 
would be similar to USSTRATCOM operating and commanding 
missile defense assets within the geographic area of 
another CC.  The ability for the United States military to 
                     67 Scarborough (2003). 
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create a few staffs that are focused on missile defense 
will also allow the military to more easily provide 
personnel and train these staffs.  This cadre of personnel 
can be highly trained and routinely exercised to help 
maintain the force readiness levels necessary to ensure 
that the human aspect of missile defense can perform as 
well as the computerized part.  Just like the Missileers of 
the Air Force, missile defense personnel can create their 
own functional area and devote their entire career to 
missile defense. 
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VI. ALTERNATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE CHAINS OF COMMAND 
The role of the overall missile defense commander (or 
coordinator, depending on the Combatant Commander 
supported/supporting relationships) and the command and 
control that can be exerted cannot be downplayed, as the 
goal is to destroy 100% of the inbound ballistic missiles 
before they can inflict damage on their targets.  This 
chapter proposes three different chains of command to solve 
the command and control problem for the BMDS.  While any of 
them will provide adequate C2 for the system, the one that 
stands out in terms of speed of command and flexibility 
should be selected to provide the best possible defense for 
the nation. 
A. THE KILL CHAIN 
The kill chain that MDA is using to illustrate the 
process of engaging a ballistic missile was most clearly 
articulated by Dale Caffall in his March 2003 thesis for 
the Naval Postgraduate School.  The steps of the kill chain 
are: surveillance, detection, tracking, identification of 
targets, targeting weapons/engagement, and kill 
assessment.68  Command and control plays an important role 
in each and every one of the steps of the kill chain.  The 
ability of the missile defense organization to adapt to the 
new thinking in C2 will either help or hinder the missile 
defense effort. 
B. CURRENT CONVENTIONAL DOCTRINAL CHAIN OF COMMAND 
Figure 5 shows how current conventional military 
doctrine would align missile defense forces for command and 
control.  The origination of the orders can come from any 
                     68 Caffall (2003) p. 20 
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of the echelons above commanders, who have the information 
necessary to order a launch.  Organizing the missile 
defense C2 in this fashion will promote familiarity within 
the military for a smoother introduction and development.  
This organization would be quick in issuing orders in a 
small crisis environment where all the needed information 
could be developed within the AOR. 
 
 
Figure 5 Current Doctrine Chain of Command 
 
The number of links required to be exercised in the 
chain of command would be a burden to the overall speed of 
command.  In the past several decades when speed is of the 
essence, the military’s command and control system has 
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failed both the national leadership and the military forces 
charged with carrying out the mission.69  David Pearson’s 
book gives three examples of instances in which the number 
of links failed to give the deployed forces their orders in 
adequate time.  The seizing of the USS Pueblo, the EC-121 
shoot down near North Korea, and the attacking of the USS 
Liberty are all instances of orders being issued but not 
reaching the units until too late.70  While it is true that 
all of these instances of slow command and control happened 
well over twenty years ago, the underlying reasons for the 
slowness with passing orders (time to absorb the meaning, 
inform superiors, ensure compliance, and redistribute them 
to lower echelon units) still exists in the military today. 
While every step in the chain of command has in the 
past given on-scene commanders a greater authority and 
responsibility, missile defense is a different kind of 
warfare.  Missile defense requires large amounts of 
situational awareness to effectively manage and fight.  A 
regional CC has the staff to manage a single conflict 
within their AOR, and even then the Commander’s Staff will 
most likely be augmented by others staffs or reserve 
components.  Creating a small cadre of personnel who run 
the TMD organization is within the staff’s capability, but 
the Operations staff (J3) and Intelligence staff (J2) 
requirements of even a relatively low complexity ballistic 
missile defense structure will overwhelm the regional CC’s 
staff.   
 
                     69 Either the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) 
or the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) both have significant 
delays in disseminating orders. 
70 Pearson (2000) p. 71-91 
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C. COMPRESSED CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR REGIONAL COMMANDERS 
As stated in Chapter III, the regional US Combatant 
Commanders have a US Title 10 responsibility to defend the 
US forces and interests within their AOR.  The regional 
CCs, if given the option, would have the missile defense 
forces to answer to their combat watches at their 
headquarters.  For the compressed COC to work, the regional 
CCs must be persuaded that the battle can better be fought 
from a centralized watch center.  The proposed compressed, 
or hybrid, chain of command (shown in Figure 6) shows that 
the missile defense forces could have two commanders.  Each 
of the commanders would be intimately involved with 
fighting at least two levels of the missile defense battle, 
with the probability of overlap of authority between the 
commanders.  While this overlap may seem advantageous from 
the point of view that more oversight might result in fewer 
missed events, it is counter to both unity of command and 
unity of effort.  These two principles of war should be 
viewed as a basis for how the United States military should 
operate in the future.   
For the co-commander relationship to work, the common 
operational picture (COP) must be fully developed and 
fielded.  Unfortunately, a ‘truly’ common operational 
picture is still an uncommon fact of warfighting.71  To that 
end the proposed chain of command would unfairly pull the 
missile defense units in two directions and increase the 
command and control aspect of an engagement.  USSTRATCOM 
                     71 USJFCOM is working hard to make the Common Operational Picture 
(COP) a reality, but the number of different data links, reference 
origins, and time stamps currently prevent a totally fused picture for 
any BM or C2 picture larger than a few units or a single service 
component (for example a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) can manage its own 
air/land/sea picture, but the picture becomes ‘muddied’ as soon as 
another link is introduced). 
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needs to be able to provide information, support, and 
control to all missile defense forces per the UCP, and each 
of the regional CCs has a vested interest in the battle 
taking place in their AOR.  It should be stressed that for 
USSTRATCOM to fully support the regional Commanders they 
have to be supportable.  As discussed in Chapter V, the 
regional CCs would have a difficult time managing their own 
missile defense, both from an organizational perspective 
and from a personnel perspective. 
 
Figure 6 Compressed Chain of Command 
 
D. FLATTENED CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR MISSILE DEFENSE 
CHALLENGES 
By applying the lessons from Desert Storm and use of 
SOF during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), an increase 
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in the efficiency and lethality of the missile defense 
forces can be created by eliminating several links in the 
chain of command (see Figure 7).  Advisory messages would 
act as a bridge to the regional CCs to inform them of 
launch orders for their AOR; these same advisory messages 
would keep the national leadership aware of the progress of 
the battle.  Within this ‘flattened’ organization there is 
stillroom for national leadership or the regional CC to 
issue counter-orders if they have additional information or 
intelligence that has not yet reached USSTRATCOM.  
USSTRATCOM, and its backups, act as the single point of 
contact for missile defense. 
The flow of the chain of command will be quick and 
efficient to allow for follow-up launches for second, or 
even third, chance intercepts.  When a sensor registers a 
missile event it will be fed into the BMDS sensor network 
and the C2BMC network.  USSTRATCOM will evaluate the type 
of missile and its trajectory to assign an interceptor to 
eliminate the threat the quickest, with the least amount of 
collateral damage possible, and with an appreciation of the 
consequence management from the debris field.  The launch 
order will be transmitted from the USSTRATCOM command 
center directly to the launch unit.  Thereby saving 
precious time that might allow for a follow-up shot against 
an incoming missile. 
This chain of command will not negate or lessen the 
unit commander’s inherent right and responsibility for 
self-defense.  If a unit operating in the field completes 
all portions of the kill chain without external support, it 
is still that unit’s obligation to engage with all means 
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available to destroy the incoming missile or if unable to 
pass the target to a unit who can destroy it. 
 
 
Figure 7 Conceptual ‘Flattened’ Chain of Command for Missile 
Defense Forces 
Flattening of a command or organization is a 
relatively new business concept that allows for greater 
horizontal communication within an organization.  There has 
always been a great deal of military work that has been 
done across military units at the action officer level 
(i.e., the military action officers would solve problems 
and coordinate amongst themselves before problems had to be 
elevated to the higher echelons of command).  This 
flattening is more of a way for the commander to increase 
the span of awareness necessary to allow for better 
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decision-making and resource management decisions to be 
accomplished in the necessary time during a missile defense 
event. 
This flattened chain of command for missile defense 
can already be seen in the deployments of the Ground-Based 
Midcourse Defense interceptors (GMDs) to Alaska.  The C2 
for the GMDs will most likely be hardwired to all of the 
national command centers (i.e., NMCC, CMOC, and USSTRATCOM 
HQ), which can already be viewed as a flattening of the 
conventional chains of command.  This C2 arrangement for 
the GMDs should be used as an example of flattening that 
could occur throughout the entire BMDS. 
E. SUMMARY 
The three chains of command, the conventional, the 
hybrid, and the flattened, each provides a different and 
varied approach to command and control.  As stated at the 
start of the Chapter each COC will enable the military to 
fulfill it mission with respect to missile defense and 
protect the US.  However, in the opinion of the author a 
decision to move to a more centralized C2 structure, in the 
form of the proposed ‘flattened’ CoC, is based on several 
assumptions that have been presented earlier in the thesis.  
These assumptions are: 
1) Turn-around time from one layer of the CoC to the next 
adjacent lower level is too long to allow for time 
budgets to be met. 
2) A centralized commander may have a better overall 
picture of the battlespace and be better equipped and 
staffed to most efficiently fight the battle.  
3) The deployment of the GMDs in Alaska is, to an extent, 




A. PROBLEMS IN MISSILE DEFENSE 
The complexity of the system that MDA is designing, 
and the military will field, is without parallel; by 
limiting human interaction the system-of-system will have 
to be a mostly self-regulating system-of-systems.  The US’s 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) failed in the late 
1980’s because of the complexity of the undertaking.  
Technology, in both aerodynamics and computers, has evolved 
greatly in the intervening two decades between the failure 
of SDI and the development of BMDS, but the risk of failure 
remains.  To mitigate some of the risk in the BMDS, the C2 
system must be adaptable, flexible and robust.  The ability 
to hit a missile with a missile has been proven, but only 
in a sterile test intercept environment.  The challenge for 
the BMDS will be to launch the interceptor in time to make 
the intercept; that duty is classic command and control and 
will be the job of the C2BMC. 
All the proposed missile defense chains of command 
will require an entirely new communications suite to handle 
the bandwidth requirements of the BMDS.  The targeting data 
alone would stymie most of the military data links now in 
service; when the C2, intelligence, and other data sets 
necessary are added to the system requirements the amount 
of bandwidth is unparalleled in the military today.72  While 
great leaps in communications bandwidth and processing 
power have been realized in the last decade Joel Babbitt 
and Mike Miklaski, in their 2003 Naval Postgraduate School 
Thesis, lay out the need for a dedicated communications 
                     72 Babbitt and Miklaski (2003) p. 15 
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system for missile defense, which was briefly described in 
Chapter IV.  For the speed with which orders, track data, 
and kill assessment need to flow for missile defense to be 
effective organizational changes alone will not work.  For 
BMDS to truly be effective a dedicated C2 system, the 
C2BMC, and a new organizational structure both need to be 
deployed.  This new communications suite, part of the 
C2BMC, will also lead the TMD Doctrine away from the ‘ride 
on the back of existing C4I’ paradigm to a contained system 
that will provide for its own commands and intelligence.  
In certain circumstances, a regional commander will be 
supporting USSTRATCOM by protecting STRATCOM assets (radars 
and MD batteries) while STRATCOM is supporting the regional 
CC with a missile defense shield. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis is limited in scope to doctrine and a more 
abstract analysis of command and control in missile 
defense.  The ideas presented here need to be further 
quantified and compared in a more technical way, for each 
of the COCs to be of increased value to the military and 
governmental decision makers that will ultimately decide 
who will lead and fight the BMDS.  The idea of more co-
Combatant Commander coordination and warfighting is a rich 
area for research and discussion not only for missile 
defense, but defense in general.73   
A big question that still is largely unanswered is a 
political analysis of consequence management.  It is 
feasible to figure out how much damage, both short and long 
                     73 Coordination was used, instead of C2, to indicate that each may 
chose to fight their respective AORs differently, but that each would 
be dependant on the others for early intercepts to increase the 
probability of terminating the missile flight before consequence 
management becomes an issue for US and friendly nations. 
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term, will be caused by falling debris that result from an 
intercept, but the political ramifications to such an event 
could be explored in seminar style wargames or other 
interactive gamming styles.  As discussed, consequence 
management will be a driving factor in intercept approaches 
for who ever fights the missile defense organization. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Military doctrine for missile defense will have to be 
rethought and rewritten once BMDS becomes operational.  The 
TMD and Global Missile Defense doctrines should be merged 
and one doctrine for missile defense should be produced as 
an example of the joint warfighting capability of the 
United States military. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the assumptions and 
constraints of the model will change and as they change the 
recommendations must also change.  For example, if the 
bandwidth to transfer all the track data to a centralized 
command node were unavailable the flattened command 
structure would not be advantageous.  The centralized 
command could not then handle all the data necessary for a 
global picture; therefore there would not be a unity of 
effort gained through unity of command. 
Missile defense effectiveness cannot be measured by 
how effective individual components are in a sterile 
testing environment, but rather how well they perform 
together during a national crisis.  The lynchpin holding 
BMDS together is the C2BMC.  Without the C2, the system 
would be able to float from under to over engagements 
throughout the globe (everyone passing up a shot thinking 
that someone else has a better shot to everyone shooting at 
everything, both situations are undesirable).  An adversary 
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could then calculate when the US would have expended its 
resources in a given area, and then the adversary could 
easily target an area to breech the defenses and claim 
victory.  To help in avoiding that the C2BMC will have to 
be robust enough to handle a myriad of different user 
types, so flexibility and adaptability within the C2BMC is 
critical. 
Chapter VI laid out three different approaches to 
tackling the missile defense chain of command issue.  All 
three COCs have their unique advantages and disadvantages 
depending on your point of view.  The conventional or 
hybrid COC might look appealing to the regional CC’s and 
allies and the flattened COC might look appealing to 
USSTRATCOM, CJCS, SECDEF, and possibly the National 
Security Council and the President. 
The flattened COC is quite possibly the leader in 
positive transformational capabilities that are presented 
to the warfighter, but further research is necessary to 
validate the claim of increased responsiveness, increased 
robustness, increased flexibility and improved decision-
making speed.  The ultimate decision as to how to structure 
missile defense will not be made by an officer in the 
military, but will be made at the highest levels of the 
Executive Branch, most likely in consultation with 
Congress.  The military should look beyond the current 
structure of the regional Combatant Commanders and provide 
the decision makers with an organization that is flattened 
and that can complete the kill chain fast enough to protect 
the United States. 
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